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IN RE MARRIAGE OF L UCA&" THE MARITAL
RESIDENCE ACQUIRED WITH SEPARATE AND
COMMUNITY PROPERTY FUNDS
DURING THE MARRIAGE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In In re Marriageof Lucas,' the California Supreme Court held
that a presumption of the character of ownership of a marital residence
acquired during marriage arises from the form of title. The court further held that this presumption could be rebutted only by proof of an
agreement between marriage partners that the form of ownership be
other than as specified in the conveyance. The court also stated that
the community or separate property nature of the funds used to acquire
the marital residence was not sufficient to rebut the form of ownership
specified in the instrument of conveyance. The holding in Lucas resolved a conflict among the California Courts of Appeal2 regarding the
proper method for determining separate and community property interests in a marital residence that was acquired with both separate and
community funds.3 Such resolution has been long overdue.4
1. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
2. Not only have conflicting approaches been taken by the First and Second District
Courts of Appeal, but various divisions within the second district have rendered divergent
decisions. InIn re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979), the
court of appeal developed a scheme ofpro rata apportionment of the equity appreciation
between the separate and community property contributions to the purchase price, even
though title to the residence was taken in both of the marriage partners' names and as community property. In In re Marriage of Bjornestad, 38 Cal. App. 3d 801, 113 Cal. Rptr. 576
(1974), the court of appeal allowed reimbursement only for separate property contributions

to the down payment on the purchase of the parties' residence. Five years later in the second
district, the court of appeal in In re Marriage of Trantafello, 94 Cal. App. 3d 533, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 556 (1979), held that the residence was entirely community in nature in the absence of
any evidence of an agreement or understanding between the parties to the contrary, while
the court inIn re Marriage of Ashodian, 96 Cal. App. 3d 43, 157 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1979), held
that real property acquired in a wife's name, alone, with earnings from a real estate business
conducted solely by the wife during marriage, was her separate property to the extent that
such property was acquired prior to 1975. Ashodian is distinguishable on its facts because
the property in that case was not the marital residence. The California Supreme Court
stated in Lucas that "[w]e therefore resolve the conflict in Court of Appeal opinions by
following Trantafello and disapproving Aufmuth and Bjornestad to the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion." 27 Cal. 3d at 815, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
3. In Lucas, the California Supreme Court was not presented with, and therefore left
unresolved, the issue of the proper method of determining the interests of marriage partners
in a marital residence acquired before marriage, in which title was perfected during marriage. While the problems inherent in the acquisition of the marital residence before mar-
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FACTS OF THE CASE

Brenda and Gerald Lucas were married in March 1964, and lived
riage may be similar to those in Lucas concerning the during-marriage acquisition of the
marital residence, see ASSEM. INTERIM Comm. ON JUDICIARY RELATING TO DOMESTIC RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT 2 App. to Assem. J., 1965 Reg. Sess. 121-25 (1965) [hereinafter

cited as FINAL REPORT], a comparable solution may not be workable for the following reasons. First, under a community property system, the separate or community character of
property is determined as of the time the property in question is acquired. See, e.g., CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 5107-5108 (West 1970) ("All property. . . owned. . . before marriage.., is
...separate property."); CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1980) ("All... property...
acquired during ... marriage ... is community property."). This concept has been called
the inception of title theory. See general, W. DE FuNiAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
CommTJN=IY PROPERTY § 64 (2d ed. 1971). Furthermore, property received in exchange for
other property, including money, may acquire the same community or separate character as
that of the surrendered property. This concept has been called the exchangeprincople. See,
e.g., Estate of Niccolls, 164 Cal. 368, 129 P. 278 (1912).
These principles operate without problem whenever the full legal and equitable titles to
property are acquired simultaneously. However, the determination of the separate or community character of property may be more difficult when the property is acquired over a
period of time, only a portion of which includes the existence of a marriage community, and
when the purchase price of the property is paid with both separate and community funds.
California, unlike the great majority of her sister community property states, has attempted
to resolve this difficulty by resorting to the source of the funds theory,
California courts have generally determined the relative interests in the marital residence
acquired with both separate and community funds by apportioning such interests in a manner related to the proportional amounts of the separate and community funds used to pay
the purchase price of the property. See, e.ag, Giacomazzi v. Rowe, 109 Cal. App. 2d 498,
500-01, 240 P.2d 1020, 1021-22 (1952).
In the case of a marital residence acquired during marriage, it is now clear from Lucas
that prior to the application of the apportionment rule, a court must find that the marriage
partners agreed that their respective contributions of separate and community funds to the
purchase price of the marital residence would retain their character as separate and community regardless of the form of title. 27 Cal. 3d at 816-17, 614 P.2d at 289-90, 166 Cal. Rptr. at
857-58. However, while such an agreementrule is workable for during-marriageacquisitions
of the marital residence, the opportunity for such an agreement process between two people
subsequently married may not present itself at the time when the premarriage acquisition of
the residence occurs simply because the marriage partners may not have known each other
at that time. This factor alone renders impossible any application of the agreement rule to
premarriage acquisition cases. As a result, the California Supreme Court, acknowledging
the need for clarification of the law in thepremarriageacquisition situation, ruled, subsequent to Lucas, that apportionment is required in thepremarriageacquisition cases. In re
Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980). In Moore, a
unanimous court adopted the so-called Lucas-Aufmuth formula as a basis for the apportionment calculation.
4. In 1969, the status of California law concerning the expenditure of separate and
community funds on the marital residence was such that one commentator wrote:
The law of California must be discussed separately. It defies not only classification, but rationalization as well. It is based on misconceptions, faulty principles
and errors compounded over the years. It harbors two mutually inconsistent lines
of cases, and its confusion is such that consensus is lacking not only as to what it
should be, but what it is.
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together continuously until their separation in December 1976. 5 At the
time of their marriage, Brenda was a beneficiary of a trust created by
her father and uncle.6 In September 1964, the trust corpus was distributed to her free of the trust. Brenda immediately established a revocable inter vivos trust, commonly referred to as a "grantor's trust," in
which she was both trustor and beneficiary.7
In November 1968, Brenda and Gerald purchased a marital residence for $23,300.8 Brenda used $6,350 from her trust funds as a down
payment, and she and Gerald then assumed an existing trust deed loan
with a balance of $16,950. 9 Title to the residence was conveyed to
"Gerald E. Lucas and Brenda G. Lucas, Husband and Wife as Joint
Tenants."'" Brenda later testified that it was her intention, though undisclosed to Gerald at the time of purchase, to acquire the residence2
solely for herself." Brenda never discussed this matter with Gerald.1
For the next eight years, with the exception of $3,000 in improvements to the residence paid from Brenda's trust funds, all payments of
loan principal and interest, real property taxes, insurance premiums,
and general maintenance and upkeep were paid with community property funds. 13
In December 1976, Brenda and Gerald separated, 4 and subsequently dissolved their marriage in April 1978.15 During the eight
years that Brenda and Gerald lived together in their marital residence,
the fair market value of the property had increased to $56,250,16 the

balance of the trust deed loan had been reduced to $14,600,11 and the
net equity in the property had increased to $41,650.18
At the dissolution proceedings, the trial court determined that the
net equity in the residence was to be apportioned as follows: first,
Brenda was to be reimbursed for home improvements paid for with her
Bartke, Yours, Mine and Ours-SeparateTitle andCommunity Funds, 44 WASH. L. REv. 379,
405-06 (1969), reprintedin 21 BAYLOR L. REv. 137, 167 (1969).
5. 27 Cal. 3d at 811, 614 P.2d at 286, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
6. Id
7. Id
8.Id
9. Id
10. Ad at 812, 614 P.2d at 287, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
11. I
12. Id
13. Id at 811, 614 P.2d at 286, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
14. Id
15. Id at 812, 614 P.2d at 287, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
16. Id at 812, 614 P.2d at 286, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
17. Id
18. Id
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-separate funds; second, the remaining equity was to be apportioned between Brenda's separate interest and the community's interest in the
residence.19 The basis of the apportionment was the ratio of the actual
purchase price payments made from Brenda's separate funds to the actual purchase price payments from Brenda's and Gerald's community
funds. As a result of such apportionment, the trial court awarded to
Brenda, as her separate property, approximately 75% of the net equity
in the residence, and the remaining 25% of the net equity to the community of Brenda and Gerald.20
The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District reversed
19. Id at 812, 614 P.2d at 287, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855. The approach taken by the trial
court in characterizing the respective property interests of the marriage partners was a combination of the Bjornestadand Aufmuh approaches: separate property contributions to the
purchase price of the marital residence were reimbursed to the contributing marriage partner with no allowance for appreciation in the market value of the residential property; and a
pro rata apportionment of the appreciated value of the home between the separate property
contributor and the community. The trial court allowed apro rata apportionment of the fair
market value of the home between Brenda's separate property down payment and the community's payments on the trust deed, but allowed Brenda to be reimbursed only for her
contributions to the improvements of the marital residence on a dollar-for-dollar basis. The
court gave no allowance for the appreciation in the fair market value of the residence attributable to the improvements.
20. The amounts stated in the interlocutory judgment differed slightly from those stated
in the findings. However, the figures used as the basis of discussion by both the court of
appeal and the supreme court were those stated in the trial court judgment. In re Marriage
of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 812 n.1, 614 P.2d at 287 n.1, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855 n.l.
The trial court arrived at its figures in the following manner. First, the court accounted
for the purchase price:
Down payment with separate property funds .....................
$ 6,350
Loan payments with community property funds ..................
2,050
Total payments from all sources .................................
8,400
Loan balance at date of separation (approximate) .................
14,600
Original purchase price of residence (approximate) ................
$23,000
Next, the trial court computed the relative percentages of the payments from separate
and community property funds to the total payments from all sources:
$6350
Percentage of Brenda's separate property interest ............ ...
$8400 = 75.5%
Percentage of Brenda and Gerald's community property interest

$2050
$2050 = 24.5%

It is interesting to note that the trial court did not consider the effecrof the character of
the assumed loan "proceeds" on the calculation. For example, if the trial court had determined that the assumed loan had been "extended" by the lender on the basis of the credit of
the community, that is, if the lender intended to look for repayment from future community
earnings, then, under the rule of Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 210, 259 P.2d 656, 661
(1953), the proceeds of the loan would have been community in character. Assuming that to
be the case, the resulting relative percentages would have been calculated as 27% apportioned to Brenda's separate interest, and 73% apportioned to the community interest. The
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the trial court's judgment as to both the apportionment of the net equity value between the separate and community interests, and the reimbursement to the separate interest of Brenda of the $3,000 home
improvement. As to the apportionment, the court of appeal decided
that the entire residence was community property by virtue of the presumption of California Civil Code section 5110, which was not rebut21
ted by evidence of any communicated understanding or agreement.
As for the reimbursement to Brenda, the court of appeal decided that in
California Supreme Court in Lucas expressed its preference for this latter method in dictum.
See infra note 102.
The trial court then calculated the apportionable value of the residence as follows:
$56,250
Fair market value of residence at separation ......................
(14,600)
Less approximate loan balance ..................................
41,650
Equity in residence ............................................
Less reimbursement to Brenda of original cost,
(3,000)
not current value, of improvements ..............................
$38,650
Net equity in residence subject to apportionment ..................
Finally, the trial court applied the respective percentages to the net equity to determine
the monetary value of Brenda's separate and Brenda and Gerald's community interests in
the net equity as follows:
Brenda's separate property interests. . . $38,650 x 75.5% = $29,200
Brenda and Gerald's community property interest. . . $38,650 x 24.5% = $9,450
21. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1980). The presumption of section 5110 was
created by the California Legislature in 1965 to resolve the problem created by Siberell v.
Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 773, 7 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1932). In Siberell, the California Supreme
Court considered the relationship between joint tenancy and community property ownership
and decided that the two forms of ownership were mutually exclusive. The effect of that
decision was that ownership by marriage partners of a marital residence taken in the form of
joint tenancy did not create a community property asset. However, in spite of Siberell,marital residences continued to be acquired in joint tenancy, primarily as a result of an uninformed buying public which was ill-served "by real estate brokers, escrow companies and
by title companies." See FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 121-25. The result was the creation of needless problems and the frustration of property owners' expectations upon either
the dissolution of a marriage or the death of a spouse. To resolve this problem, the California Legislature amended California Civil Code § 164 by adding the following provision:
[When a single family residence of a husband and wife is acquired by them during
marriage as joint tenants, for the purpose of the division of such property upon
divorce or separate maintenance only, the presumption is that such single family
residence is the community property of said husband and wife.
Act of July 17, 1965, ch. 1710, § 1, 1965 Cal. Stat. 3843. While this section was repealed in
1969 in connection with the enactment of the Family Law Act, ch. 1608, § 8, 1969 Cal. Stat.
3313, section 164 was superseded by California Civil Code § 5110, which contains a similar
provision:
When a single family residence of a husband and wife is acquired by them during
marriage as joint tenants, for the purpose of the division of such property upon
dissolution of marriage or legal separation only, the presumption is that such single
family residence is the community property of the husband and wife.
CAL. CMv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1980). It was this special presumption to which the
court of appeal referred in Lucas.
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the absence of agreement, the rule of See v. See 22 prevented reimbursement of one marriage partner for his or her separate property funds
expended on behalf of the community.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Issue and Holding of Lucas

The issue presented to the California Supreme Court in Lucas was
whether a mere showing of the separate source of funds used as the
down payment for a marital residence acquired during the marriage
was sufficient to warrant an apportionment of the value of the residence
between the separate and the community interests regardless of the
form of title.3 The supreme court decided that such a showing was
insufficient to warrant an apportionment, and that the title to the marital residence would be presumed to be as specified in the instrument of
conveyance, absent a "greater showing." 24 The "greater showing" required by the court was nothing less than an "understanding or agreement"25 communicated by one marriage partner to the other as to the
intended nature of the property interest acquired by each partner in the
marital residence.
In deciding this issue, the supreme court found it necessary to
evaluate the divergent approaches to the Lucas issue developed by the
California courts of appeal 26 in light of the various presumptions re22. 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966). In See, the California
Supreme Court held that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the use of separate
property for community purposes is a gift to the community of the funds expended, and that
the marriage partner expending the separate funds cannot claim reimbursement upon a subsequent dissolution of the marriage. Id at 785, 415 P.2d at 780, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 892; see also
Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 570, 432 P.2d 709, 716, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13, 20 (1967).
23. 27 Cal. 3d at 811, 614 P.2d.at 286, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
24. Id at 815, 614 P.2d at 288, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
25. Id, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
26. Prior to Lucas, most courts failed to distinguish the issue of the nature of property
interests of the marriage partners in a residence acquired during marriage with separate and
community funds, from that of whether and how to apportion separate and community
interests in a marital residence acquired by one of the marriage partners before marriage.
The result was a broad landscape of divergent decisions and widespread confusion as to the
state of California community property law on this point. See, e.g., Editorial, 6 COMMUNriT PROP. J. 381 (1979). Sometimes the courts required apportionment between the separate and community interests. E.g., In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 371-72, 618
P.2d 208, 210, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662,664 (1980); In re Marriage of Sparks, 97 Cal. App. 3d 353,
356-57, 158 Cal. Rptr. 638, 640 (1979); In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 444, 45457, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 673-75 (1979); In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 25657, 105 CaL- Rptr. 483, 491 (1972); Bare v. Bare, 256 Cal. App. 2d 684, 689-90, 64 Cal. Rptr.
335, 338-39 (1967); Garten v. Garten, 140 Cal. App. 2d 489, 493-94, 295 P.2d 23, 25-26

(1956); Forbes v. Forbes, 118 Cal. App. 2d 324, 325-26, 257 P.2d 721,722-23 (1953); Ortega
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garding community property ownership in California.2 7 Furthermore,
the supreme court established an analytical approach that could be easily implemented by trial courts faced with the problem of characteriz-

ing the property interests of marriage partners in their marital
residence.
B. DivergentApproaches Utilized by the CaliforniaCourts of Appeal
In deciding Lucas, the supreme court considered the three approaches developed by the courts of appeal for determining the relative
interests of marriage partners in a marital residence acquired during
marriage, when one partner has contributed separate funds for its acv. Ortega, 118 Cal. App. 2d 589, 594-95, 258 P.2d 594, 597-98 (1953); Giacomazzi v. Rowe,
109 Cal. App. 2d 498, 500-01, 240 P.2d 1020, 1021-22 (1952); Vieux v. Vieux, 80 Cal. App.
222, 228-29, 251 P. 640, 642-43 (1926). Other courts have required reimbursement to the
separate property contributor of the separate property funds expended on the marital residence; e.g, In re Marriage of Bjornestad, 38 Cal. App. 3d 801, 804-06, 113 Cal. Rptr. 576,
577, 578-79 (1974). Still other courts have forfeited either the separate property funds to the
community, e.g., In re Marriage of Trantafello, 94 Cal. App. 3d 533, 542-46, 113 Cal. Rptr.
556, 562-64 (1979), or the community property funds to the marriage partner contributing
the separate property funds; e.g., Martin v. Martin, 52 Cal. 235, 237 (1877); Flournoy v.
Flournoy, 86 Cal. 286, 293-94, 24 P. 1012, 1013 (1890); In re Marriage of Ashodian, 96 Cal.
App. 3d 43, 46, 157 Cal. Rptr. 555, 557-58 (1979).
27. In addition to the judicially created presumptions regarding the community property
system, see infra note 41, the California Civil Code provides that all property acquired
before marriage is separate property, CAL. Civ. CODE § 5107 (West 1970) (all property of
the wife acquired before her marriage is her separate property); CAL. CrV. CODE § 5108
(West 1970) (all property of the husband acquired before his marriage is his separate property); and all property acquired during marriage is community property, CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 5110 (West Supp. 1980) (all real property located within California, and all personal property located anywhere is community property if acquired during a marriage). While these
provisions appear absolutely conclusive as to the character of acquired property, the courts
have treated them as rebuttable presumptions. For example, in Baron v. Baron, 9 Cal. App.
3d 933, 939, 88 Cal. Rptr. 404, 407 (1970), the court of appeal referred to the principle that
all property acquired during marriage is community property as the "general presumption."
Additionally, CAL. CrV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1980) sets forth certain "special presumptions." Among these are: (1) the presumption that any property acquired by a married woman prior to January 1, 1975 is her separate property if the acquisition is evidenced
by a writing; (2) the presumption that if such married woman acquires property with another person, she takes the property as a tenant in common unless a different intention is
expressed in the writing; (3) the presumption that, if a married woman acquires property
with her husband prior to January 1, 1975 and the acquisition is evidenced by a writing, the
property is community property; and (4) the presumption that a single family residence
acquired by marriage partners in the form of a joint tenancy during their marriage is community property solely for the purposes of dissolution or legal separation.
Like the judicially created presumptions, these statutory presumptions are rebuttable
either by a showing that the underlying fact or facts giving rise to the presumption (the basic
fact) does not exist, or that thepresumedfactdoes not exist. Baron v. Baron, 9 Cal. App. 3d
933, 939, 88 Cal. Rptr. 404, 407 (1970).
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quisition.28 These approaches either (1) allowed for a pro rata apportionment,29 (2) required reimbursement of separate funds to the
contributing marriage partner,30 or (3) presumed the title to be as
stated in the conveyance of title.3 ' While the court in Lucas did not
limit itself to these alternatives, it eventually "followed" the third approach. 32 For a proper understanding of Lucas, it is important to analyze the various approaches presented to the court.
1. The Bornestad approach
The first of the three approaches established by the courts of appeal was in In re Marriageof Bjornestad.33 In Bjornestad,a husband
and wife purchased their home with each partner providing a portion
of the down payment from their separate property funds, the wife providing $5,400 and the husband $450.3 4 While the title to the house was
in joint tenancy, the marriage partners actually intended that it be held
as community property. 35 Furthermore, neither marriage partner intended to make a gift to the other of the down payment funds expended
from their respective separate funds.36
The trial court determined that (1) the family-residence-in-jointtenancy presumption of California Civil Code section 511037 required
that the home be considered community property to the extent that the
home's value exceeded the wife's andhusband'sinitialseparatefundscontributedtothe purchaseprice down payment; and (2) because the marriage partners did not intend to make a gift of their separate-fund down
payments to each other, each was entitled to reimbursement for the
amount of his or her respective contributions to the down payment.38
In a brief opinion, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court's judgment.39
In several respects the Bjornestad approach is inconsistent with the
supreme court's holding in Lucas. First, California Civil Code section
5110 explicitly provides that when a family residence is acquired by the
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

27 Cal. 3d at 813, 614 P.2d at 287, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
In re Marriage of Bjornestad, 38 Cal. App. 3d 801, 113 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1974).
In re Marriage of Trantafello, 94 Cal. App. 3d 533, 156 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1979).
27 Cal. 3d at 815, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
38 Cal. App. 3d 801, 113 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1974).
Id at 803, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77.
Id, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
Id
See supra note 27.
38 Cal. App. 3d at 806, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 578-79.
Id, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
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marriage partners in joint tenancy, it is presumed to be community
property for the purposes of dissolution or legal separation. This presumption apparently applies to the ownership interest in the residence
as a whole. The court of appeal's piecemeal approach to the joint tenancy presumption of section 5110 appears to be unique and is not supported by the language of the section.
Second, it is difficult to rationalize the court of appears holding
which allowed reimbursement to the marriage partners in the absence
of an agreement that the partners would be reimbursed for separate
expenditures on behalf of the community. The mere absence of an intent to make a gift of separate property by one partner to the other is
not an agreement to reimburse and, therefore, would not be sufficient
to rebut the presumption of See v. See. n"
Finally, the trial court found that the marriage partners had intended to hold the residence as community property despite the joint
tenancy form of title. Assuming that the partners had communicated
this intent to each other, the court of appeal should have held that the
form of title was determined by the intent of the marriage partners
which, in this case, was to create community property rather than joint
tenancy.41 Nonetheless, the supreme court in Lucas disapproved of the
jornestad approach, 42 and declined to follow the piecemeal application of the family-residence-in-joint-tenancy presumption of section
40. 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966). See supra note 22.
41. The California courts have developed certain judicial presumptions regarding community property. Among them is the presumption that the character of an interest in property is as stated in the written title evidencing the ownership. Eg., Machado v. Machado, 58
Cal. 2d 501, 506, 375 P.2d 55, 58, 25 Cal. Rptr. 87, 90 (1962); Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d
202, 212, 259 P.2d 656, 662 (1953); Socol v. King, 36 Cal. 2d 342, 345-46, 223 P.2d 627, 62930 (1950); Tomaier v. Tomaer, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 757, 146 P.2d 905, 907 (1944). However, this
presumption arising from the form of title can be rebutted by evidence of an agreement or
understanding between the marriage partners that the property interests in the marital residence were to be other than as evidenced in the conveyance of title. Machado v. Machado,
58 Cal. 2d at 506, 375 P.2d at 58,25 Cal. Rptr. at 90; Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d at 212, 259
P.2d at 662.
Other judicial presumptions developed by the California courts regarding community
property law are: (1) separate property funds expended on behalf of the community are a
gift to the community in the absence of an agreement for reimbursement, e.g., Weinberg v.
Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 571, 432 P.2d 709, 716, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13, 20 (1967); See v. See, 64
Cal. 2d 778, 785, 415 P.2d 776, 780-81, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892-93 (1966); and (2) the character of loan proceeds extended to the community on the basis of the community credit (the
creditor's intent to look to the community for repayment) are community property funds.
Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d at 210, 259 P.2d at 661.
All of these presumptions are rebuttable either by a showing that the underlying fact or
facts giving rise to the presumption, Le the "basic fact," does not exist, or by a showing that
the "presumed fact" does not exist. See supra note 27.
42. 27 Cal. 3d at 815, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
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5110, and the reverse application of the rule of See v. See.43
2. The Aufmuth approach
The second approach considered by the California Supreme Court
was that established in In re Marriageof 4ufmuth, 4 which involved a
marital residence held as community property.45 In Aufmuth, husband
and wife purchased a family residence for $66,500. The home was
purchased with a $16,500 down payment from the wife's separate property, with the balance of the purchase price obtained from a trust deed
loan. The trial court found that the wife had not intended to make a
gift of the down payment to the community, and that neither partner
had communicated with the other as to the separate or community status of the funds used for the down payment.46
Upon the dissolution of the marriage, the trial court held that the
down payment had retained its separate character,47 and apportioned
the net equity in the home between the wife's down payment and the
community interest in the trust deed loan.48 Both of the marriage partners objected. The wife claimed that because the down payment had
been made with her separate funds and the balance of the purchase
price had been obtained from a loan secured by the residence, the
house should be characterized entirely as separate property, subject to
the community's right to reimbursement for community funds expended on the property. 49 The husband contended that because of the
general presumption of California Civil Code section 5110 that all
property acquired during marriage is community property,50 the resi43. The rule of See operates as follows: a marriage partner expends separate property
funds for the benefit of the community. Unless the partners have affirmatively agreed or
have an understanding that the contributing partner will be reimbursed for the expenditure,
the contributing partner has made a gift to the community. The jornestad court would
reverse this presumption, requiring reimbursement absent an affirmative agreement or understanding between the marriage partners not to look for subsequent reimbursement of
separate funds expended on behalf of the community. The court in See clearly stated that
such a reverse presumption is not the rule: "The basic rule is that the party who uses his
separate property for community purposes is entitled to reimbursement from the community
or separate property of the other only f there is an agreement between the parties to that
effect." 64 Cal. 2d at 785, 415 P.2d at 781, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 893 (emphasis added).
44. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
45. Id at 453, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
46. Id at 455, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 673-74.
47. Id at 456, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
48. Id at 457, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
49. Id at 454, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
50. See supra note 21.
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dence should be characterized as entirely community property.5 1 The
separate funds
husband also argued that the wife's expenditure of her
52

for the down payment was a gift to the community.

The court of appeal in Aufmuth disagreed with both contentions

and upheld the trial court's theory and method of apportionment.5 3 In
so doing, the court of appeal analyzed both the down payment and the
trust deed loan proceeds to determine their character as separate or
community property.5 4 The court applied California Civil Code section 5.107" and the principle that property exchanged for other prop51. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 454, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
52. Id
53. Id at 454, 457, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 673, 675. The apportionment formula approved by
the court of appeal in Aufmuth is identical to that used by the supreme court in Lucas. The
formulae in both cases were based on the respective percentages of the actual payments
made by the separate property contributor and by the community to the total actual payments. In both cases, "actual payments" included trust deed loan proceeds still outstanding
as of the date of dissolution. The supreme court in Lucas approved the Aufmuth apportionment formula in dictum proffered as "guidance in the event that on reconsideration the
[trial] court finds there was an understanding or agreement that [the wife] was to retain a
separate property interest in the residence." 27 Cal. 3d at 816, 614 P.2d at 289-90, 166 Cal.
Rptr. at 857-58. The court concluded that the Aufmuth formula was "the most equitable
method of calculating the separate and community interests," id at 816, 614 P.2d at 289, 166
Cal. Rptr. at 857, and then illustrated the application of the rule. Id at 816 n.3, 614 P.2d at
290 n.3, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858 n.3. Careful analysis of the Lucas and theAufmuth formulae
will reveal that the balance of the trust deed loan proceeds as of the date of dissolution or
legal separation is included in calculating the respective separate and community interests.
Thus, depending upon the amount of the loan balance and its characterization as either
separate or community in nature, see supra note 5, the resulting calculations can be skewed
greatly towards one interest or the other. See supra note 20.
54. It is not clear why the Aufmuth court insisted upon beginning its analysis of the
character of the property interests by focusing upon the source of the acquiring funds instead of relying upon theform-of-the-tite presumption. One explanation may be that seven
years earlier an appellate court from the same district stated in In re Marriage of Jafeman,
29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 256, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483, 491 (1972) that "[i]f community funds are used
to pay part of the purchase price of property acquired by one spouse prior to marriage, the
property cannot be considered wholly community for the separate and community sources
of the property can be traced." However, Jafeman involved the acquisition of a marital
residence by one marriage pirtnerptior to the marriage, and is, therefore, distinguishable
fromAufmuth and Lucas. Both of those cases involved acquisitions of the marital residence
during the marriage. The preservation of the separate interest in thepremarriagesituations
is clearly desirable because: (1) some precautionary measure is needed to prevent the "unintentional" loss of pre-existing property interests by parties entering marriage relationships;
and (2) the tracing of acquiring funds to their respective sources is facilitated by the establishment of a fixed date for the commencement of the community. However, when the acquisition of the marital residence takes place during the marriage, a more logical starting
point in the analysis is to look at the intention of the marriage partners as expressed in the
form of the title of ownership.
55. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5107 (West 1970) provides that "[a]ll property of the wife, owned
by her before marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise, or descent,
with the rents, issues, and profits thereof, is her separate property."
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erty acquires the same character as the surrendered property;5 6 the
court therefore concluded that the wife's down payment established a
separate property interest in the residence. The court also applied the
presumption of Gudeli v. Gudelj,57 that the community character of
property purchased with loan proceeds is determined by the lender's
reliance on community assets for repayment of the loan, and found no
evidence sufficient for rebuttal. Thus, the court of appeal held that the
loan proceeds were community property in character because the
lender had extended credit to the community. Furthermore, the court
of appeal stated that the general presumption "that all property acquired during marriage is community is controlling only when it is impossible to trace the source of the specific property."5 " The Aufmu/h
court noted that:
The amounts of separate and community funds are ascertainable in the present case. .

.

. [The] wife contributed

$16,500 of her separate funds for the down payment on the
home while the community contributed the balance of the
purchase price in the amount of $50,000. Thus, the trial court
correctly determined that [the] wife had a separate property
interest to the extent of her investment in the home and that
the balance was community property.59
It is interesting to note that even though the residence in Aufmuth
was held to be community property, the court of appeal did not consider controlling the judicial presumption that the form of ownership
interest in the residence was as stated in the title, absent an agreement
or understanding of the marriage partners to the contrary. The court
stated that "[tihe form of the instrument under which
the parties hold
'60
property.
the
of
status
the
of
conclusive
title is not
56. See supra note 3.
57. The court in Gudeti stated that:
[tihe character of property acquired by a sale upon credit is determined according
to the intent of the seller to rely upon the separate property of the purchaser or
upon a community asset. . . . In the absence of evidence tending to prove that
the seller primarily relied upon the purchaser's separate property in extending
credit, the trial court must find in accordance with the [general] presumption [of
Civil Code section 5110].
41 Cal. 2d at 210, 259 P.2d at 661.
58. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 457, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (emphasis added).
59. Id
60. The Aufmuth court cited Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 259 P.2d 656 (1953), as
authority for this proposition. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 455, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 673. It is not clear
what theAufmuth court meant by "conclusive." If the court was stating that the form of title
is not a "conclusive" presumption as to the character of the property ownership, then the
citation to Gudel"was proper. However, if the Aufmuth court meant that the form of title
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By comparison, the key to the Lucas decision is the resurrection by
the California Supreme Court of the form-of-the-title presumption.
The supreme court noted that this presumption had not been abolished
or modified in any way by the Legislature's attempt to resolve the joint
tenancy problem in 1965. In that year, the Legislature added the special family-residence-in-joint-tenancy presumption to section 5110 of
the California Civil Code." Moreover, the supreme court did not believe that the showing required to rebut the form-of-the-title presumption had been modified in any way by the Legislature.6 2 The court
reasoned that the Lucas rule would further the intentions and expectations of the marriage partners as to the consequences of the specified
form of ownership of the marital residence. 3
The court in Lucas also noted that the initial point in the analysis
should be the determination of the form of the title taken by the parties. 6" A line of California Supreme Court cases had established previously that the form of the title of property ownership created a
rebuttable presumption that the ownership interest in the property was
does not even rise to the level of a presumption of the specified form of ownership, it was
clearly incorrect. The court in Gude(/ stated that:
[t]he presumption arising from the form of the deed may not be rebutted solely by
Nor can
evidence as to the source of the funds used to purchase the property ....
the presumption be overcome by testimony of a hidden intention not disclosed to
the other grantee at the time of the execution of the conveyance.
41 Cal. 2d at 212, 259 P.2d at 662 (citations omitted).
61. See supra note 27. The supreme court noted a report conducted by the California
Assembly in 1965 that cited the much abused use of the joint tenancy form of ownership by
marriage partners acquiring a family residence, and the problems that resulted upon a subsequent dissolution of the marriage, or upon the death of one of the marriage partners.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 121. One of the major problems that the supreme court
noted was that caused by the division of property upon a marriage dissolution. If the title to
the family residence were held in community property form, or in such a form that the home
were found to be community property, then the court could award the entire residence to
one marriage partner or the other pursuant to California Civil Code § 4800(b)(1). The court
noted that social policy favored allowing the trial court to award such residence to the "wife
as a family residence for her and the children." 27 Cal. 3d at 814, 614 P.2d at 288, 166 Cal.
Rptr. at 856 (citation omitted). If the title were held in joint tenancy, however, the trial court
would be precluded from awarding the entire residence to one partner. The Legislature
attempted to solve this problem by adding the presumption to California Civil Code § 5110
that although a single family residence was acquired by marriage partners in joint tenancy,
upon dissolution of the marriage or separation, the residence would be presumed to be community property. See 1969 Cal. Stat. 3339 (1969).
62. "There is no indication that the Legislature intended in any way to change the rules
regarding the strength and type of evidence necessary to overcome the presumption arising
from the form of title." 27 Cal. 3d at 814, 614 P.2d at 288, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 856 (citation
omitted).
63. I at 815, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
64. Id at 813, 614 P.2d at 287, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
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as specified in the form of title." The court in Lucas noted that this
line of cases allowed for a rebuttal of the form-of-the-title presumption
only by evidence of a marital agreement or understanding that the
ownership interests were to be different from those specified in the form
of title. 6 Finally, the supreme court stated that tracing of the acquiring
funds to a separate or community property source, or evidence of an
undisclosed intention by one partner to maintain the separate property
character of any contributions, was insufficient to rebut the presump67
tion of the form of ownership as evidenced in the conveyance of title.
In Lucas, the supreme court was concerned with the erosion of the
form-of-the-title presumption and the sufficiency of the level of proof
required to rebut that presumption. The holding in Lucas can be
viewed as an attempt by the court to revitalize the form-of-the-title presumption. For example, the court made reference to the fact that the
presumption had been modified by statute in 1965.68 This reference
was to the addition of the family-residence-in-joint-tenancy" presumption to California Civil Code section 5110, which operates to convert a
joint tenancy form of title into community property in the event of a
dissolution or legal separation.6 9 The court specified the problems
which the Legislature sought to solve by this modification, and implied
that the modification was extremely narrow in scope.7 °
Furthermore, through its disapproval of 4ufmu/h the court expressed its concern about the apportionment line of cases that involved
acquisitions of the marital residence during marriage. 71 However, it is
significant that the Lucas court failed to criticize In re Marriage of
Iafeman,72 an apportionment case which involved the acquisition of
the marital residencepriorto marriage. Since its decision in Lucas, the
supreme court has required the apportionment approach in thepremarriage acquisition cases.73
Finally, it must be noted that the court in Lucas did not categori65. Id
66. Id
67. Id
68. Id
69. See supra note 61.
70. 27 Cal. 3d at 813-14, 614 P.2d at 287-88, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855-56.
71. See Estate of Neilson, 57 Cal. 2d 733, 744, 371 P.2d 745, 751, 22 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7
(1962); Bare v. Bare, 256 Cal. App. 2d 684, 689-90, 64 Cal. Rptr. 335, 338-39 (1967); Forbes
v. Forbes, 118 Cal. App. 2d 324, 325-26, 257 P.2d 721, 722-23 (1953); Giacomazzi v. Rowe,
109 Cal. App. 2d 498, 500-01, 240 P.2d 514, 597-98 (1952); Vieux v. Vieux, 80 Cal. App. 222,
228-29, 251 P. 640, 642-43 (1926).
72. 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1972).
73. See supra note 3.
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cally disapprove of the apportionment approach of Aufmuth. Rather,
the court merely indicated that before apportionment would be applicable, the marriage partners must show that they agreed or understood
that, despite the form of title, they had intended such apportionment. 74
3.

The Trantafello approach

A third approach considered by the California Supreme Court was
that established in In re Marriage of Trantafello,75 which involved a

marital residence held in joint tenancy. In Trantafello, a husband and
wife purchased a residence during their marriage. The down payment
was made from the husband's separate property funds,76 with the balance of the purchase price obtained from a trust deed loan. Although
the marriage partners took title to the residence as joint tenants, they
never discussed the character of their ownership, nor were they aware
of the form of title in which the residence was held until their marriage
dissolution proceedings had commenced.77 The trial court found that
the residence was entirely the husband's separate property.78
The wife contended, on appeal, that the home was community
property because it had been acquired during their marriage and the
husband, therefore, had no right of reimbursement for his separate
funds used for the down payment.79 The husband argued that the trial
court was correct in awarding him the residence as his separate property, but if the trial court had erred, he was entitled to reimbursement
for the down payment.8 0
The court of appeal decided that the residence was community
property in its entirety, and that the husband had no right to reimbursement for his expenditures of his separate property. 1 In arriving
at this decision, the Trantafello court's analysis proceeded in two steps.
First, the court noted that the residence was held in joint tenancy,82
which would invoke the special family-residence-in-joint-tenancy presumption of California Civil Code section 5110,83 absent sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. Thus, the court looked for proof that
74. 27 Cal. 3d at 816, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
75. 94 Cal. App. 3d 533, 156 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1979).

76. Id at 536-37, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
77. Id
78. Id at 537, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
79. Id at 538, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 559.

80. Id

81. Id at 539, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 559-60.
82. Id, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
83. See supra note 61.
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the presumption had been rebutted.84 The court stated that the only
evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption was a "common understanding that the joint tenancy deed to the family home was not to have
the legal effect given it by Civil Code section 51 1O. ''85 The court concluded that "the record is devoid of any evidence on which the trial
court could find that the residence of the parties was not community
property." 6
Second, the court considered whether the husband should have
been reimbursed for his expenditure of separate funds for the down
payment. The court of appeal noted the rule of See v. See, 87 and
looked for evidence of an agreement between the marriage partners
that the husband should have been reimbursed for these expenditures.
Finding none, the court of appeal stated that:
[mI]ere tracing of the funds establishing their separate character does not under such circumstances suffice to prove a right
to reimbursement.
The rule remains [that the] [h]usband's right to reimbursement cannot be based solely upon proof that his separate
funds were employed to make the down payment upon the
family residence which was acquired as community property.
To be entitled to reimbursement, he was required to show that
there was a mutual agreement between himself and [his]
[wjife to preserve the separate property status of the contributed funds.8 8
Thus, Trantafello stands for the following propositions: (1) taking
title to a family residence as joint tenants presumes the existence of a
joint tenancy unless the marriage partners have agreed otherwise;
(2) upon a dissolution of the marriage, or a legal separation, the joint
tenancy is presumed to be a community property interest; and
(3) neither marriage partner shall be reimbursed for separate property
expenditures made on the behalf of the community in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary. It is this approach that the California
Supreme Court endorsed and adopted in Lucas.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

94
Id
Id,
64
94

Cal. App. 3d at 540, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
at 542, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
156 Cal. Rptr. at 562.
Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966). See supra note 22.
Cal. App. 3d at 544-45, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 564-65.
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C.

In Re Marriage of Lucas: An Analytical Approach

In Lucas, the California Supreme Court established a two step analytical approach for determining the character of the ownership interests of the marriage partners in the marital residence. First, the form of
the title as actually taken by the marriage partners must be determined. 9 The title may specify a particular form, such as "joint tenants," "community property," or "tenants in common." Or, the court.
may determine that no form of title is specified in the conveyance, because the written instrument of title may evidence only a conveyance to
the marriage partners as named grantees. For example, the document
may simply read "to Brenda and Gerald."
If a particular form of ownership is specified in the written instrument of title, then the form of ownership will be presumed to be as
specified. 90 This presumption arising from the form of title can be rebutted only by a showing that the marriage partners had an agreement
or understanding to the contrary.9 1 If no agreement or understanding
contrary to the apparent form of title can be shown, the character of the
ownership of the residence is determined by the instrument of title. 92
Mere tracing to the source of the acquiring funds will not be sufficient
to rebut this form of title presumption. 93
If no particular form of ownership is specified in the written instrument of title, then California Civil Code section 5110 creates a general presumption that the residence is community property. 94 This
general presumption may be rebutted by a "lesser showing" than is
necessary to rebut a special presumption created by an instrument of
conveyance which does state the form of title.95 A general presumption
may be rebutted merely by tracing the source of the funds used to acquire the residence. 96 It is in this latter instance, or upon a showing
89. 27 Cal. 3d at 813, 614 P.2d at 287, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
90. Id at 813-15, 614 P.2d at 287-88, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855-56.
91. Id at 815, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
92. Id
93. Id at 813-15, 614 P.2d at 287-88, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855-56.
94. Id at 815, 614 P.2d at 288, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
95. Id
96. Thus, under the Lucas approach, the court in Aufmuth would have held that the
property involved was community property. The court would have reached this conclusion
as follows: first, the court would have ascertained that the form of title specified in the
written instrument was "as community property"; therefore, a presumption of community
property ownership would have arisen. Because there was an express designation of ownership in the form of title, the "greater showing" of an agreement or understanding between
the marriage partners contrary to the form of title would have been required to rebut the
presumption of community property ownership. Second, the court would have looked for
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that the parties agreed and understood that separate contributions to
the purchase price would remain the separate property of the contributing partner, that apportionment of property interests in the marital residence would be appropriate.

In applying the foregoing analytical approach to the facts before it,
the Lucas court first noted that Brenda 'and Gerald took title to their
marital residence as joint tenants. Therefore, the court reasoned that a
presumption arose from the form of ownership that Brenda and Gerald
97
owned the residence as joint tenants, and not as community property.

Next, the court looked for a "greater showing" to rebut the presumption of a joint tenancy, in the form of an agreement or understanding between Brenda and Gerald that the ownership of the
residence was not to be held in joint tenancy form. The only evidence
as to the Lucas' intentions regarding separate ownership was a desire
by Brenda, undisclosed to Gerald, that the residence was to be her sep-

arate property.98 The court found that this undisclosed intent was insufficient to rebut the presumption of the joint tenancy form of
ownership. 99

A presumption of joint ownership of a family residence having
been established, the court noted that the special presumption of California Civil Code section 5110 was operative. 00° The result was that,
for the purpose of the dissolution proceeding only, absent a "common
understanding that the joint tenancy deed to the family home was not
to have the legal effect given it by Civil Code section 5110, " 10 1the marital residence was presumed to be Brenda and Gerald's community
evidence of such agreement or understanding to the contrary. Inlufmuth, no such agreement or understanding was present. Therefore; the presumption of community property
ownership of the marital residence would have prevailed, regardless of the separate funds
expended on behalf of the community for the purchase price down payment.
Likewise under the Lucas rationale, the Bjornestad court would have found that the
residence at issue was held as community property. First, the court would have determined
that the form of title was specified to be 'Joint tenancy." Thus, a presumption of joint
tenancy ownership would be created, rebuttable only by a showing of an understanding or
agreement between the marriage partners to hold the property other than in that form. In
Bjornestad,there was evidence that the partners had in fact agreed and understood that the
marital property was to be held as community property. Therefore, the form of the title
presumption would have been sufficiently rebutted under Lucas. The court would have
determined that the marital residence was the Bjornestads' community property in its entirety, absent an agreement under the rule of See v. See, see supra note 22, to reimburse
either of the partners for any separate property funds expended on behalf of the community.
97. 27 Cal. 3d at 814-15, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
98. Id at 812, 614 P.2d at 287, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
99. Id at 815-16, 614 P.2d at 289-90, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857-58.
100. Id at 815, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857. See supra note 61.
101. In re Marriage of Trantafello, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
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property.

IV. CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court in In reMarriageofLucas clarified

the law concerning the acquisition of the family residence by marriage
partners during marriage, the purchase price of which may be paid for
with a mixture of the partners' community property and one or both of
the partners' separate property. In analyzing the rationale for the analytical approach established by the court, it is apparent that the court
was concerned with the consequences of applying strict real property
rules unforeseen by marriage partners ill served by "real estate brokers,
escrow companies and by title companies,"103 who continue to advise
102. The supreme court in Lucas remanded the case to the trial court for additional
proceedings:
Neither the parties nor the court applied the correct rules to this case, and it is
possible that had they done so the proof might have been different. In the interest
ofjustice, therefore, the matter of the community or separate property character of
the residence must be remanded for reconsideration in light of these rules.
27 Cal. 3d at 816, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
Additionally, the supreme court, in dictum, illustrated the "most equitable" method of
calculating the separate and community interests in the Lucas' family residence should the
trial court find on remand that Brenda and Gerald had in fact agreed and understood that
Brenda's separate property funds used for the down payment were to remain her separate
property. Id at 816 & n.3, 614 P.2d at 290 & n.3, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858 & n.3. See also In re
Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 457, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 675. It is interesting to note
that the court expressly used the Aufmuth formula as its reference point. This method differed significantly from the approach used by the trial court in Lucas. See supra note 53.
First, the supreme court fractionalized the fair market value of the marital residence "at the
time of trial" into (1) the original purchase price and (2) the capital appreciation. As to the
original purchase price, the separate interest and the community were reimbursed for the
funds actually contributed to the purchase price. As to the capital appreciation, the court
determined the relative proportion of contributions as of the date of the acquisition of the
marital residence. Next, the court applied the rule of Gude(, see supra note 60, to determine
the character of the trust deed loan proceeds. Assuming that the loan was extended by the
lender on the basis of the community credit, the court included the loan proceeds as a community contribution. The resulting proportions were applied to the amount of capital appreciation and allocated between the marriage partners accordingly. Compare supra note
20. As has been shown, see supra note 53, this method will generally produce the larger
portion of the interest in the residence for the community, assuming that the trust deed loan
has been extended to the community and not to one of the marriage partners on the basis of
his or her separate credit. This inclusion of the loan balance in the calculation illustrates
that the supreme court prefers a community property result. For a brief critique of the
Lucas-Aufmuth apportionment formula, see Barnett, Lucas v. Lucas, or Footnotesfrom FarAway Forums, L.A. Daily J., Dec. 19, 1980, (Report), at 15.
The supreme court subsequently approved use of the same formula for apportioning
property interests in apremarriageacquisition of a marital residence that had been partially
paid for with separate property funds, and partially with community property funds. In re
Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980).
103. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
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-home buyers that: (1) home ownership should always be in the joint
tenancy form; and (2) joint tenancy and community property are
equivalent forms of ownership. The Lucas court was also apparently
concerned about the consequences of strict rules regarding the division
of property upon the dissolution of a marriage. The court believed that
in the majority of instances When marriage partners acquire a marital
residence, they expect their ownership interests in the residence to be
community property. Therefore, the court in Lucas, assisted by the operation of certain judicial and statutory presumptions in community
property law, attempted to align as closely as possible the consequences
of home ownership with the expectations of the marriage partners as
expressed either in the title to the residence at the time of the acquisition of the home, or in subsequent supplementary communications between the marriage partners.
Ralph Joseph Novotney Jr.

